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I will merely mention three aspects of the paper by Gladys Acosta
with which I disagree, without referring to the many arguments with
which I do agree.  Perhaps this will make my comment excessively
critical, but I believe that polemic is academically more useful than
praise, and hence the style that I have chosen.
I. THE FAULT OF LEGAL POSITIVISM
Many partisans of feminism blame legal positivism for the current
situation women face in many countries.  I do not agree at all with this
assessment.
Legal positivism is a theory that makes it possible to describe the law
without recurring to moral concepts.  If the laws that discriminate
against women meet certain requirements, of course positivism will
consider them provisions of law.  Yet, how does this prejudice the
feminist cause?  Feminists know that there are legal provisions, and
what they seek is to replace them by other provisions, also legal, but
with a different content.
After identifying a provision as law, much remains to be done.  Let us
suppose that the positivist identifies a provision that discriminates
against women as a legal provision, or a rule of law.  In addition to
identifying it as a rule of law, the conservative positivist may approve of
it.  The liberal positivist, however, will first identify it as a rule of law, but
will object to its content on the basis of moral reasoning.
Contrary to what some imagine, positivism evaluates legal rules from
a moral standpoint.  What distinguishes it from natural law theory is
that positivism evaluates the norm after identifying it as a legal rule.
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Perhaps what certain branches of feminism wish to attack is not legal
positivism, but ideological positivism, which holds that a rule should be
obeyed simply because it is a legal rule.  For the ideological positivist,
moral evaluation is superfluous, but for the legal positivist this is far
from being the case.  If the target is ideological positivism, any attack is
useless, since I don’t know of any serious author who supports this
theory.
II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT
The issue of the moral justification of punishment is extremely
important, and there is, of course, no agreement on the best theory of
moral justification.  Though some theories may be deficient, it is not
because they are foreign to the Latin American context.  All the
theories for justifying punishment claim to be universal.
The problem with the retributive conception of punishment, for
example, does not arise from the circumstance that Kant was not Latin
American.  It stems from the difficulties that theories of ethical duty
have in accounting for the function of punishment.
Bentham was not Latin American either, but the deterrent
conception of punishment seems more convincing.  The task of
feminism should not be to seek justifications of the penalty that reflects
the supposed idiosyncracy of some continent, but to seek the best
justification of the penalty.  My suggestion is to study the utilitarian
conception of punishment in greater depth.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS
Of course, feminists and non-feminists agree in repudiating sex
crimes.  The Millian principle of harm suffices to justify this
condemnation for liberals.  Yet liberals are also concerned with respect
for constitutional guarantees, and the partisans of feminism should
share this concern.  Therefore, I cannot help but feel alarmed at the
proposal to shift the burden of proof in sex crimes, jeopardizing the
constitutional protection of the presumption of innocence.
Feminists may distrust the liberal theory of Rawls and argue that
justice in the distribution of resources stops at the door to one’s home.
Yet one should not distrust the liberalism of Mill, a firm partisan of
women’s rights his whole life.  Taking Mill as a model, feminism and
liberalism have a long way to go together, each in good company.
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